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Do nonlinguists practice linguistics? 
An anti-eliminative approach to folk theories 
 
Marie-Anne Paveau 
University of Paris 13, EA 452 CENEL 
 
 
‗Oh, stop calling me Madam, it‘s so annoying! Henever says the things I want to 
hear,he only saysthings that get on my nerves‘ (a second-hand goods dealer, Paris, 
September 2008, 20
th
 arrondissement; translated from the French) 
 
Popular prejudice will eventually prevail over scientific incredulity, and the 
observations of old wives will get the better of learned theories. When it comes to 
naive observations, science, by nature excessivelyoverweening, is always one step 
behind public common sense (Raspail, Histoire de la santé et de la maladie; 
translated from the French). 
 
Introduction
1
 
 
Folk linguistics appears to have beenfairly comprehensively described and defined, 
not least in this special issue, but also ininternational and (later) French research conducted 
over the course of the last fifteen years
2
. A range of linguistic practices known as 
folklinguistics (or by various other adjectives, includingprofane, spontaneous, wild, naïve, 
lay, etc.) are now well-established, and a rich field of research has developed as a result, 
drawing linguists with an interest in the imaginary and representational productions of 
speakers (whoever they may be). 
 Following Brekle 1989, a tripartite typology of folk practices in linguistics was 
presented in Paveau 2000 (1. Descriptions, 2. Prescriptions, 3. Interventions). We are now 
beginning to understand the wide range of settings in which these practices can be found, as 
well asthe variety of folk activities involving the use or study of language (the press, schools, 
internet forums, conversation guides,everyday conversations etc.), as illustrated by the 
paperspublished in this issue. We are also beginning to understand just what it is that 
nonlinguists (Preston) actually do, and precisely where and when they do it. Yet we appear to 
know far less about who nonlinguists exactly are and about the value of folk linguistic 
theory.It is the central purpose of this paper to examine these two issues. For heuristic 
purposes, the paper begins with a typology of nonlinguists based on categories that are not 
discrete. To be a nonlinguist is not a permanent state but an activity that can be practiced at a 
particular point in time and in a particular place even by linguists themselves.There is in this 
sense a nonlinguist position thatcan always be traded for another position. Examples of 
activities that belong only debatably to folk linguistics will be examined. These examples will 
be used to challenge the relations posited between the ‗identities‘ of nonlinguists and the 
nature of their activities. Secondly, following on from Paveau 2007 and 2008a, the paper will 
examine the complex epistemological and philosophical issue of the validity of folk 
linguistics, a question clearly linked to (and subsumed by) the validity of the folk sciences 
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more generally. In particular, the paper will examine the concepts of knowledge and 
epilinguistic awareness, which provide arguments in favor of an integrational position
3
, i.e. 
an anti-eliminative position: folk propositions are not necessarily false beliefs that must be 
eliminated from the sphere of science, but constitute perceptive, subjective and incomplete 
forms of knowledge that need to be incorporated into the scientific data of linguistics. 
 
1. The identity of nonlinguists 
 
The question of the identity or identification of nonlinguists is perhaps one of the thorniest 
issues in folk linguistics. The professional identification of linguists is made relatively easy 
byclear indicators such as university courses, qualifications, academic specialisms pursued 
(in the case of France) within specific sections of the CNU (Conseil National des Universités 
or National University Council) and of the CNRS (in particular sections 7, 9 and 34 of the 
CNRS, the French National Center for Scientific Research) and a disciplinary literature that 
has beenrelatively well covered and marked out inreference works and dictionaries. We have 
yet to establish equally reliable criteria for the definition of the professional identity 
ofnonlinguists involved in linguistic activities. For instance, is a writer a folk linguist? 
Shouldproofreaders in the written media and publishing housesbe viewed as folk linguists? 
And what about lawyers, who are required as part of their work to analyze words as carefully 
and as scrupulously as a professional lexicologist?In the absolute, there is perhaps good 
reason to answer in the affirmative. However,a comparison with ordinary speakers, e.g. the 
‗man on the street‘ celebrating the beauty of vocabulary or bemoaning the deterioration of 
language (a common figure in France, a country where language is a constant object of 
passionate debate
4
), is perhaps enough to challenge this view. After all, the first three figures 
seemmore entitled to the label ‗linguist‘ than the fourth figure (i.e. the ‗man on the street‘), a 
somewhat naïve and (in truth) uncultivatedamateur linguist. In short, how might weidentify 
or describe the category of speakers involved in producing metalinguistic and metadiscursive 
statements based on subjective non-disciplinary andnon-academic positions? 
 
1.1.Discursive positions 
 
As in many areas of knowledge within the human sciences, binary Cartesian thought 
(linguists vs. nonlinguists conceived as discrete categories) leads to the dead-endof idealism. 
We may therefore be better advised to view the issue as a matter of degree. At the risk of 
suggesting a position that will seem iconoclastic to those with a firm belief in the purity and 
objectivity of science, it seems preferable to posit a continuum between those who practice 
linguistics proper and those who practice something that cannot properly be described as 
linguistics. In this sense, we may posit two opposing poles representing theoretical extremes: 
the ‗erudite‘, ‗scientific‘ or ‗academic‘ linguist involved in handling ‗exact‘ knowledge,as 
opposed to the spontaneous linguist producing analyses of the kind illustrated by the second-
hand dealer quoted in the epigraph (‗he never says the things I want to hear‘). 
 In a recent study, Günter Schmale conducted an initial analysis of the issue. 
Analyzing folk linguistics as a crossroads between academic linguistics, amateur linguistics 
and teaching/vulgarization (incidentally a view entirely subscribed to in this paper), Schmale 
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provided a brief typology of spontaneous linguists focusing on conversation analysis: 
Schmale‘s spectrum,ranging from ‗a lack of knowledge about conversation‘ to ‗a perfect 
knowledge of conversational organization‘, includes ordinary speakers, writers, ‗amateur‘ 
linguists, non-conversationalist‘ linguists, and ‗conversationalists‘ (Schmale 2008, see in 
particular the figureincluded in Schmale‘s paper). Thispaperaims to provide a more global 
analysis that applies not only to conversation but to language and French verbal productions 
more generally. The typology presented in this paper is designed to achieve the following 
objectives:  
 
- to describe the nature of ‗non-linguistic‘ activity as accurately as possible by positing 
discursive positions that are by definition transitory and not inherently linked to 
social, professional or cultural identities, rather than socially fixed identities (e.g. the 
writer, the journalist, the typographer).Examples of non-linguistic activity include the 
following situations: the owner of a bar begins a conversation about text-messaging 
with customers; a foreign secretary produces a text about the deterioration of French; 
a professional linguist produces a non-linguistic discourse about language, for 
instance an aesthetic discourse (e.g. not liking a word because it ‗sounds‘ wrong and 
‗grates‘ on the ears), by virtue of the well-known discordance between behavior and 
introspection on which Labovian sociolinguistics was partly based and which may be 
viewed asa defining feature of the concept of linguistic security vs. linguistic 
insecurity (Labov 2001 [1975]); 
- to raise the question of the incorporation of productions pertaining not only to 
metalinguistics but also to epilinguistics, i.e. an unconscious and therefore implicit 
form of language competence. This includes all types of wordplay, tongue twisters, 
puns and deliberate malapropisms, pronunciation games (les chaussettes de 
l’archiduchesse, la reine Didon qui dîna dit-on, etc.), plays on signifiers such as ‗Mr. 
and Mrs. so and so have a son…‘5, jokeswith a linguistic substrate or dimension, 
impressionsor imitations of accents and ways of speaking, etc. Speakers who adopt a 
simultaneously expert and playful or ludic position toward language will be referred 
to as ludo-linguists. The issue is to determine whether these productions (which 
involvea highly sophisticated form of epilinguistic competence) pertain to linguistic 
activity. Since they perform an explicit didactic role, it seems reasonable to posit that 
they do in fact pertain to linguistic activity. However, their position at the limit 
between linguistic and language activities (i.e. between activities about language and 
activities involving the use of language) somewhat complicates the issue.  
 
1.2. An attempt at a typology 
 
The following typology is based on recent research on folk linguistics and normative 
positions, on observations made in previous research conducted by the author, and in 
particular on a corpus used as part of research presented in La Langue Française– Passions et 
Polémiques. A ‗coefficient‘ of possession of linguistic knowledge is used to categorize the 
various positions, and is supplemented by a rough categorization of types of practices based 
on the trilogy presented above: 
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- Professional linguists, who provide linguistic descriptions; 
- Nonlinguist academics (‗linguist-historians‘ such as Mension-Rigau in Aristocrates et 
Grands Bourgeois or ‗linguist-sociologists‘ such as Bourdieu in La Distinction), also 
involved in articulating linguistic descriptions; 
- Amateur linguists (or laylinguists, e.g.academicians such as M. Druon, lawyers such 
as G. Cornu, the author of a book on legal linguistics, see Cornu 2005 [1990] and 
infra 1.3.1.),providing descriptions and prescriptions; 
- Logophiles, glossomaniacs6, and other ‗language fanatics‘ (e.g. J.-P. Brisset and G. 
Orwell),involved in language interventions through invention or deformation; 
- Correctors/proof-readers/editors (e.g. the legendary proof-reader of Le Monde J.-P. 
Collignon and his successors,involved inproducing a discourse about their ‗linguistic‘ 
activity on the blog ‗Langue sauce piquante‘7); experts on television shows (e.g. 
‗Maître‘ Capelovici and his successors on Des chiffres et des lettres)offering 
descriptions and prescriptions (including corrections); 
- Writers and essayists (Proust, J. Paulhan, P. Daninos, P. Jullian, R. Beauvais…) 
involved in both descriptive and prescriptive activities; 
- Ludo-linguists (comedians, impressionists, impersonators, humorists, punsters; e.g. 
Thierry Le Luron imitating Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing, Sylvie Joly and her 
‗Bourgeoise‘ character, Florence Foresti and her character Anne-Sophie de la 
Coquillette, Coluche and his ‗beauf‘ character, i.e. a ‗boor‘ or ‗redneck‘), providing 
linguistic descriptions/interpretations; 
- Particular categories of speakers (e.g. activists and language lovers) and lawyers in 
their textual and oralactivities, centering on description and intervention; 
- Ordinary speakers (e.g. the second-hand dealer on rue de la Chine, the anonymous 
authors of readers‘ mail and messages on internet blogs and forums, the ‗dominants‘ 
described by J.-C. Passeron; see infra), who probably combine all three types of 
practices. 
 
Far from being discrete or isolated,the various positions need to be viewed aspermeable and 
even interchangeable. After all, a speaker or writer may easily shift from one position to 
another, as illustrated by the case of J.R.R. Tolkien, the philologist and lexicographer and 
professor of medieval English, who may reasonably be viewed as a logophile by virtue of 
having invented fictional languages, including the much celebrated Elvish language. A 
similar kind of boundary-crossing wasalso exemplified by Saussure, the first professional 
linguist in the history of the theory of the sign and a glossomaniacexhibiting distinct ludo-
linguistic tendencies in his Anagrammes. 
 The permeability of the various positions also implies a permeability of knowledge 
fields and areas. In other words, linguistic knowledge informs the knowledge of folk linguists 
and vice versa. This paper argues that categories are not discrete since it is important to 
recognize that scientific or academic knowledge is not unrelated to or disconnected from the 
epilinguistic awareness of speakers. 
 
1.3. Some examples: lawyers, writers, logophiles, ludo-linguists and activists 
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1.3.1. Legal linguistics 
 
The textbook on legal linguistics by G.Cornu (2005 [1990]) provides an interesting example 
of folk linguistics in action. Cornuis careful to base his argument on the Saussurian ‗science 
of language‘ while at the same time (and no doubt unconsciously) holding lay or profane 
prediscourses that will seem particularly ‗naïve‘ to professional linguists. For example, Cornu 
defines legal linguistics as ‗the particular application of the fundamental science of general 
linguistics to the language of law‘, and notesthat ‗he may at least entertain the hope that his 
work will be acknowledged as a kind of practical linguistics, in the same way as linguistics 
applied to poetry‘ (2005 [1990]: 25; translated from the French). The analogy between law 
and poetry is supported by a reference to R. Jakobson. Cornu applies Jacobson‘s linguistic 
methodology (designed for the study of poetry) directly to the legal field – hence the final 
analogy: ‗What is true of poetic discourse should also be true of legal discourse‘ (2005 
[1990]: 25; translated from the French). To which we might ironically respond: duly noted. 
But the analogy is interesting precisely because it illustrates one of the most common forms 
of lay or profane thinking
8
:Cornu‘s approachprovides an example of the use of a folk method 
for the development of a folk body of knowledge. Cornu also describes legal vocabulary as 
‗the reflection of the legal system‘ (p.58), therebyimplying a theory of language conceived as 
a reflection against which scientific (academic) linguistics has developed. The book includes 
many other examples of spontaneous linguistics polished by the veneer ofacademic 
linguistics to serve the use of language in his field. The main point is that thetype of folk 
linguistics illustrated by Cornu actually ‗works‘, as D.Dennett might put it (see infra 2.1.2.), 
in the sense of efficiently organizing and structuring the specialized uses of language in the 
legal domain. 
 
1.3.2. Artaud’s ‘other languages’ 
 
‗In February 1947‘, writes A. Tomiche (2002: 141), Artaud described this ―other language‖ 
that he has never ceased to seek as a ―humming/chanted/[…] between 
Negro/Chinese/Indian/and villon French‖. Artaudnot only emphasized the vocal dimension of 
the language, caught between song and scansion, but also underlined the mixture and 
blending of languages – specifically a blend of languages associated with syntactic 
transgressions and intelligibility. The case of Artaud provides an example of linguistic 
activity performed by a nonlinguist, a writer with linguistic, epilinguistic and multilinguistic 
knowledge well beyond the competence of the average speaker (Artaud was familiar with 
several foreign languages). Artaud‘s aim wasto developa new language essentially 
characterized by blending and transgression. Not content with merely creating and inventing 
language forms, Artaud also analyzedlanguage formsusing a metalinguistic discourse 
illustrated by Tomiche in an example that perfectly illustrates a folk discursive position 
adopted by a writer: 
 
I could give many examples, but instead I will give just one –and a particularly 
interesting example at that, since Artaud does not merely introduce a term, i.e. 
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‗tétême‘ (a word that combines several languages) in a sentence in French: ‗Dans le 
sommeil on dort, il n’y a pas de moi et personne que du spectre,/ arrachement du 
tétême de l’être, par d’autres êtres (à ce moment-là éveillés), de ce qui fait que l’on 
est un corps‘. Not without irony, Artaudthen proceeds to carry out a metalinguistic 
analysis of the morphology of the term, explaining that the word ‗tétême‘ combines 
the Greek term éma (blood) withtête and ‗thé‘ which, redoubled, refers to that which 
rests and that which burns: ‗Et qu’est-ce que le tétême?/ Le sang du corps à ce 
moment-là allongé, et qui sommeille car il dort. Comment le tétême est-il le sang? 
Par le éma, devant qui le t se repose et désigne ce qui se repose comme le tévé des 
Marseillais. Car le té fait un bruit de cendre lorsque la langue le dépose dans les 
lèvres où il va fumer./ Et Éma en grec veut dire sang. Et tétême, deux fois la cendre 
sur la flamme du caillot de sang, de caillot invétéré de sang qu’est le corps du 
dormeur qui rêve et ferait mieux de s’éveiller‘‘ (XIV, p.16)9. (Tomiche 2002: 144; 
translated from the French) 
 
1.3.3. Logophiles, glossomaniacs and other language fanatics 
 
Not unlike writers and theirown folk activity,but outside the field of literature and its fictional 
possibilities, the lover of language is involved inactivities aimed at the invention of imaginary 
languages. A logophile is typically a folk linguist, as depicted by Yaguello in a study of 
‗language fanatics‘: 
 
The language inventor is an amateur, in both senses of the term; through a lover of 
languages, s/he often knows nothing about the science of language. But above all s/he 
demonstrates an aesthetic form of concern: the desire to produce a comprehensive 
view, a totality, an enclosed yet exhaustive whole endowed with perfect symmetry, its 
cogs bathing in oil, and in whichthere is no room for discordance or ambiguity, and 
where wastage, equivocationand misunderstanding are banished. (Yaguello 2006: 45; 
translated from the French) 
 
The social and professional position of the language lover implies contact with the data of 
culture. Unlike outsider artists devoid of culture, language loversoperate within the universe 
of literacy: 
 
A language lover is generally a cleric, a professor or a doctor, i.e. a man with an 
office or practice, a man with a small beard and round metal glasses, as shown by the 
gallery of portraits adorning the book by Monnerot-Dumaine, one of the two bibles of 
interlinguistics. (Yaguello 2006: 46; translated from the French) 
 
Language loversengage in professional activities that closely resemble the activities of 
scholarly (academic) linguistics, even if they lack the specialized knowledge of 
academiclinguistics. According to Yaguello, the work of the logophile involves: 
 
1. Accumulating data; 
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2. Classifying data; 
3. Establishing an explanatory principle – e.g. the imitation of the sounds of nature, or a 
correspondence between the meaning of words and their acoustic and/or articulatory 
realization; 
4. Organizing data in the form of a genealogical tree, with the mother language giving 
birth to its offspring, i.e.the past and present languages of humanity. (Yaguello 2006: 
47) 
 
1.3.4. Ludo-linguists or when folk linguistics enters the stage 
 
As noted above, ludo-linguists are defined as experts in the playful manipulation of signifiers. 
This section provides a more detailed case study of impersonators and impressionists, 
especially those specialized in accent imitation.An ability to imitate accents is a key skill in 
the repertoire of all comedians and humorists (professional impressionists or amateurs) and 
isfounded on a spontaneous socio-linguistic theory. Accents are phonic manifestations of 
regional, national, social, ethnic-cultural, gender, sexual and other variations. Examples of 
social accent variation include the impressions performed by Valérie Lemercier in the film 
Les Visiteurs (see her impression of the aristocratic accent exemplified by ‗Béa‘ de 
Montmirail on seeing her ancestor ‗Hub‘‘ arriving from the Middle Ages accompanied by her 
loyal servant Jacquouille la Fripouille, 1993), the ‗grande bourgeoise‘ impressionsperformed 
by Sylvie Joly in her show La cigale et la Joly (2006), and the intonations of the actress 
Mathilde Casadesus, scientifically recorded in the audio document accompanying the book 
Les accents de France edited by Léon et al. (Léon et al., 1983). Impressions of ethnic cultural 
accents
10
 can be found in performances by ‗Omar et Fred‘ in the short television show ‗Le 
service après-vente des emissions‘ currently broadcast in the early evening on the French 
television channel Canal + (see in particular Omar‘s impression of a generic ‗African‘ 
accent),in television appearances by the tennis player and singer Yannick Noah (see in 
particular Noah‘s anti-racist impression of a Cameroonian accent), in the exaggerated North 
African tones and inflections of Djamel Debbouze and Mohand Saïd Fellag (Terbouche 
2008)
11
, and in the Jewish-North African emphases of comediansElie Kakou and Gad 
Elmaleh. Returning to fashion thanks tothe short television show Les Deschiens in the late 
1990s (with impressions focusing in particular on the rural accent of the Sarthe region of 
France; see Pugnière, 2006), and more recently the French film Bienvenue chez les Ch’tis by 
Dany Boon (2007), regional accents have long been a target of (more or less disparaging) 
impressions, particularly among writers, as illustrated by the famous scene in Molière‘s Don 
Juaninvolving the peasants Charlotte and Pierrot (act 2, scene 1). Accents that are more 
difficult to capture and label (the term sexual is unsatisfactory while homosexual is 
inaccurate; I prefer the terms gendered accent or sexual identity accent, even sexual 
preference accent) and that are more stigmatizing, such as the ‗gay‘ accent illustrated by the 
‗folle‘ articulations of Michel Serrault in the play and film La Cage aux Folles and Gad 
Elmaleh in the film Chouchou by Merzak Allouache (2003), also provide evidence of the 
linguistic skills of impressionists and impersonators – skills based on a subtle though non-
scientific (i.e. non-academic) treatment of phonetic phenomena. It is importantto recognize 
that professional linguists rarely examine accents, particularly accents that have an ethnic, 
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cultural, ‗sexuality‘ or community dimension: to the best of the author‘s knowledge,no 
research has so far been conducted in France on the ‗gay‘ accent, in its ‗folle‘ version or 
otherwise, with the exception of a paper by Siouffi entitled ‗Les homos parlent-ils comme les 
hommes ou comme les femmes?‘ (1998). Although the issue is addressed in American social 
dialectology, particularlyin research on linguistic attitudes (see for example Preston 1992), 
very few studies have been conducted in the area. Accents have been explored at length by 
other folk linguists, for instance sociologist-linguists (who view accents as powerful social 
organizers),themselvespositioned at the heart of the folk activities of a third category of folk 
linguists –the dominant classes. J.-C.Passeron argues that the dominant classes perform a 
linguistic activity of intervention, i.e. social ranking based on accents: 
 
In the same way that the spontaneous linguistics of the dominant classes defines the 
dominant accent as an absence of accent, i.e. a ‗zero accent‘ against which regional or 
popular accents are understood and defined as more or less colorful deformations, so 
the spontaneous stylistics of modes of livelihood establishes the marks borne by the 
dominant classes (and which indicate both domination and the constraints entailed by 
the exercise of domination) as non-marks serving as a counter-point for perceiving the 
deformations of popular bodies and faces. (Passeron 1999, online; translated from the 
French) 
 
1.3.5. Activist speakers: a folk analysis of discourse 
 
I would like to conclude this presentation of examples with an example of folk linguistics in 
thespecific context of activism – in this instance a folk analysis of discourse. The case in 
point is ‗a workshop for the analysis and critique of political discourse‘ ironically entitled 
‗The re-enchanted world of Nicolas Sarkozy‘ and held in the 19th arrondissement of Paris in 
November 2007 by the ‗Coordination des Intermittents et Précaires d‘Ile-de-France‘. The first 
session was presented as follows: 
 
First session: Wednesday 31 October 2007, 7pm to 10pm at the CIP-IDF 
The basic idea is relatively simple: the point is to conduct a collective analysis and 
critique of political discourse as part of a workshop open to all. In our view, 
theoretical thought cannot be the primary focus of the project, since an understanding 
of certain key notions and tools would need to be taken for granted, 
therebyautomatically limitingaccess to the workshop. Rather, the project is designed 
as a practical and political workshop, if viewed from the perspective of its ultimate 
objective: to develop efficient means of countering the effects of authorized political 
discourse (both on us and on others). We might say therefore that it is a workshop for 
self-training in the critique of ideology 
More concretely, we made a decision to work on speeches given by Nicolas Sarkozy. 
Discussions about the topic were heated, and as it turns out no one is entirely satisfied 
with the choice. We all agree that power comes from further afield and that its action 
extends well beyond the purely ‗political‘ field, and that seeking for power precisely 
where we are told that it exclusively belongsis to fall prey to ideological discourse. 
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Having said that, if power is everywhere, then it hardly matters where it is captured, 
since the important thing is to focus our analysis and critique on a discourse that is 
both current and addressed to everyone – everyone has the right and (we firmly 
believe) the capacity to respond to it. (Announcement received via email, October 
2007) 
 
The passage quoted above shows that folk theory is a practical theory, or a theory of practice. 
Note that the object of the workshop is the use of discourse and its effects on individuals, and 
not (for example) the description of rules and regularities. Lay or profane knowledge is 
generally practical knowledge, a form of knowledge that is ‗useful‘ to speakers for the 
purposes of operating in society. The point now is to consider the validity of folk theory. 
 
2. What are folk linguistic theories actually worth? 
 
Folk linguistics raises one of the most difficult epistemological questions, particularly in the 
human and social sciences: namely the validity of (pseudo) scientific theories. In France, very 
little research has so far been conducted on this issuebecause folk linguistics has tended to be 
viewed as the embodiment of a normative position or as a reflection of purism (Paveau, 
Rosier 2008). Cartesianism and the positive (not to say positivist) images of science in 
widespread circulation in France have also done little to encourage this line of research. By 
contrast, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science (especially in the United 
States)have provided illuminating analyses of the folk sciences in general and of folk 
linguistics in particular. Without claiming to apply them mechanically, these analyseswill be 
used to examinethe validity of spontaneous theories of language. 
 
2.1.Epistemic evaluations of folk linguistics  
 
Are folk theories valid? There are three possible answers to this question. 
 
2.1.1. The eliminative position 
 
In the philosophy of mind, the so-called eliminative position, or eliminative materialism 
(Feyerabend, Rorty, Sellars, Paul and Patrician Churchland, Laurence), is based on the thesis 
that an understanding of mental states founded on common sense theories is incorrect and 
invalidsince it has no scientific basis. Common sense understanding is clearly not founded on 
neurological data. For example, there is no neuronal basis to certain theories of intentionality 
or even to consciousness itself, i.e. notions that are among the most difficult to 
naturalize.According to the philosopher Paul Churchland (2002 [1981]), folk theories are 
entirely false and are on the verge of being replaced (‗eliminated‘) by irrefutable evidence 
provided by the neurosciences. Churchland‘s view is shared by the philosopher Stephen 
Laurence (2003), who argues that folk theories in any science are usually incorrect, adding 
that linguistics is particularly vulnerable in view of the fact that it is such a relatively young 
theory. 
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 Applied to the findings of folk linguistics, the eliminative theory would posit that folk 
theory is false because it is based on perceptive, intuitive, evaluative and even imaginative 
data, but not on any scientifically verifiable data. 
 
2.1.2. An intermediate position: Dennett’s ‘soft realism’ 
 
The philosopher Daniel Dennett (1990 [1987], 2002 [1991]) has defended an intermediate 
position known as ‗soft realism‘. Dennett‘s position is situated halfway between the extremes 
of Fodor‘s ‗industrial strength realism‘ and the Churchlands‘ eliminative materialism. His 
position specifically concerns folk psychology, which Dennett describes in the following 
terms: 
 
People are even less predictable than the weather, if we rely on the scientific 
techniques of meteorologists and even biologists. But there is another perspective, 
familiar to us since childhood and used effortlessly by us all every day, that seems 
wonderfully able to make sense of this complexity. It is often called folk psychology. 
It is the perspective that invokes the family of ―mentalist‖ concepts, such as belief, 
desire, knowledge, fear, pain, expectation, intention, understanding, dreaming, 
imagination, self-consciousness, and so on. (Dennett 1998 [1987]: 7) 
 
Soft realism can be summarized as follows: folk vocabulary and folk concepts are operational 
and even necessary for social life, and spontaneous perceptions are absolutely fundamental 
patterns in human life: 
 
There are patterns in human affairsthat impose themselves, not quite inexorably but 
with great vigor, absorbing physical perturbations and variations that might as well be 
considered random; these are the patterns that we characterize in terms of the beliefs, 
desires and intentions of rational agents. (Dennett 1998 [1987]: 27) 
 
As Dennett observes, folk psychology actually works (‗treating each other as intentional 
systems works‘, p.51), even if it does not workpermanently.While folk psychology may be an 
imperfect, incomplete and therefore non-generalizable theory, in many ways it is also a valid 
theory. It is perhaps useful to quote Dennett at some length here, especially his relatively 
comprehensive definition, which contains many elements that will be useful fortheanalysis of 
linguistic theory: 
 
We use folk psychology all the time, to explain and predict each other‘s behavior; we 
attribute beliefs and desires to each other with confidence – and quite unself-
consciously – and spend a substantial portion of our waking lives formulating the 
world – not excluding ourselves – in these terms. Folk psychology is about as 
pervasive a part of our second nature as is our folk physics of middle-sized objects. 
How good is folk psychology? If we concentrate on its weaknesses we will notice that 
we often are unable to make sense of particular bits of human behaviour (our own 
included) in terms of belief and desire, even in retrospect; we often cannot predict 
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accurately or reliably what a person will do or when; we often can find no resources 
within the theory for settling disagreements about particular attributions of belief or 
desire. If we concentrate on its strengths we find first that there are large areas in 
which it is extraordinarily reliable in its predictive power. […] Second, we find that it 
is a theory of great generative power and efficiency. […] Third, we find that even 
small children pick up facility with the theory at a time when they have a very limited 
experience of human activity from which to induce a theory. Fourth, we find that we 
all use folk psychology knowing next to nothing about what actually happens inside 
people‘s skulls. (Dennett 1998 [1987]: 47-48) 
 
Applied to folk linguistics, Dennett‘s analysis would implythat the data of folk linguistics are 
acceptable and can be incorporated into linguistic theory since they provide exact perceptive 
and organizing descriptions of language, but they cannot serve as a basis for a general theory 
of language. 
 
2.1.3. The integrational position: folk data are linguistic data 
 
This position emphasizes the knowledge of non-linguists, which is viewedas legitimate and 
recognizable as such. Preston and Niedzielski are clear from the outset of their synthesis: ‗If 
the folk talk about language, they must, of course, know (or least believe they know) about it‘ 
(1999: 10). Linguistic theory is considered in terms of its operability and practical truth rather 
than its logical truth. The same position was also held by the social psychologists Llewellyn 
and Harrison in a study conducted on perceptions of linguistic and discursive forms in 
corporate communications (2006). Their study showed that participants demonstrated definite 
linguistic competence in recognizing uses of the pronoun we and in identifying passive 
transformation and nominalization. The study also found that the linguistic competence of 
participants can do without metalanguage and even without learning identified phrases: 
 
In this regard, it is worth making the point that formal sounding linguistic categories, 
such as those discussed above, describe mundane features of everyday language use. 
It is perfectly possible for individuals to deploy and identify instances of ―passive 
transformation‖, for example, without having heard of the term. (Llewellyn & 
Harrison 2006: 580) 
 
In this respect,Llewellyn and Harrison share the same position as Sylvain Auroux, who 
observed in a study of grammatization that linguistic knowledge is not necessarily distinct 
from the knowledge provided by epilinguistic awareness: 
 
The continuum between epilinguistics and metalinguistics can be compared to the 
continuum between perception and physical representation in the natural sciences. 
Whereas the natural sciences distanced themselves from perception at an early 
stage(from Galilean physics onwards) before departing still further from it in due 
course, linguistic knowledge has only sporadically broken its links with epilinguistic 
awareness. (Auroux 1994: 24; translated from the French) 
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For example, ‗naïve realism‘ (Achard-Bayle 2008: 34 et seq. and here), which involves 
attributing concrete entities of the world with more or less discrete boundaries that make 
them coincide with the nouns designating them, may amount to a non-conscious form of 
epilinguistic knowledge (‗I call a cat a cat, full stop‘, as the second-hand dealer quoted in the 
epigraph might have put it), but also to a scientific and argued philosophical-semantic 
position. The notion of epilinguistics is probably one of the keys for understanding how and 
why (not unlike folk psychology) folk linguistics actually ‗works‘. Epilinguistic awareness is 
a structure that provides linguistic data gained by perception. If linguistics does empirical 
justice to the experiential and cultural dimensions of language, in other words if the object of 
linguistics incorporates the uses of language by social and cognitive subjects, the perceptive 
data of folk linguistics may be viewed as linguistic data per se. 
 
2.2. To what extent are the intuitions of speakers verifiable? 
 
If folk linguistics, like folk psychology, may be said to ‗work‘, it is because there is a source 
of perceptions, judgments and evaluations that can provide accurate results. In linguistics, 
this source is the intuition of the so-called ‗native speaker‘ (to use Chomsky‘s terminology)or 
epilinguistic awareness(to use the phrase coined by the French linguist Antoine Culioli
12
). 
Yet to what extent can all speakers be said to have or share the same intuition? Is there not a 
crucial difference between the intuition of the non-linguist speaker and the intuition of the 
linguist-speaker? The philosopher Michael Devitt argues that the intuitions of linguists are 
better than the intuitions of folk linguists because unlike received ideas, intuitions are not 
innate but theory-laden.Devitt provides a fairly robust critique of Chomskyan intuition and 
offers an alternative theory: ‗This theory treats linguistic intuitions as opinions resulting from 
ordinary empirical investigation, theory-laden in the way all such opinions are‘ (Devitt 2006: 
483). Devitt concludes by positing the impossibility of using such intuition as a foundation 
for linguistics on the grounds that it is not scientifically theory-laden: 
 
I see linguists as pulled two ways in their treatment of the intuitive judgments of 
speakers. On the one hand, the received view is that speakers represent the true 
linguistic theory of their language and derive their intuitive judgments from those 
representations. So, those intuitive judgments, deploying terms drawn from that 
theory, should be the primary data for the linguist‘s theory. On the other hand, there is 
the attractive thought that all judgments deploying those terms are laden with an 
empirical linguistic theory. Where the judgments are those of the ordinary speaker, 
that theory will be folk linguistics. We do not generally take theory-laden folk 
judgments as primary data for a theory. So we should not do so in linguistics. (Devitt 
2006: 485) 
 
The skepticism toward the intuition of the native speaker and ‗the contemplation of their own 
idiolects‘ by linguists had already been criticized by Labov in the late 1960s (1976 [1972]: 
37). Labov argued that the intuitions of linguists are far from being better than the intuitions 
of ‗folks‘: 
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[…] what would happen if we submitted a sizeable sample of linguists‘ judgments on 
grammaticality to a general population ? The most systematic study of this type was 
carried out by Spencer (1973). She tested 150 sentences from syntactic studiesby 
Perlmutter, Carlota Smith, Postal, Ross, Rosenbaum and R. Lakoff. There were 60 
judges : 20 graduate students in linguistics, 20 other graduates students, and 20 people 
from the town of State College. […] 
If we examine all of these measures, we see that no one linguist did remarkably better 
or worse than others in this respect […] There are no findings as yet that support the 
hope that the introspective judgments of linguists are reliable, reproducible, or general 
in their application to the speech community. We must then ask, what is the 
consequence of these facts for the linguistic theories which rest on such judgments? 
(Labov 1975: 15-16) 
 
The intuitions of linguists are not credible not because they are cultured and pre-theorized (as 
Devitt would argue), but for epistemological reasons. According to Labov, linguistics should 
not be based on unverified intuitions and facts: 
 
Since every study of intuitive judgments carried out so far indicates that there is a 
sizeable experimenter effect,the uncontrolled intuitions of linguists must be looked on 
with grave suspicion. If these intuitions are said to represent only the linguist‘s 
idiolect, then the value of his analyses rests on a very uncertain foundation. He might 
submit to further experimental studies so that others can test the consistency of his 
judgments […]. (Labov 1975: 30) 
 
Should we therefore eliminate data that are based on intuition? While it is clear that such data 
should not be discarded, linguistics needs to acknowledge andincorporatethe relativity of 
intuition, or what Labov terms ‗the experimenter effect‘, and to apply a number of key 
principles: 
 
The solution to the problem stated so far seems clear enough. We need only (1) 
recognize the experimenter effect and (2) return to the original notion of working only 
with clear cases. We could then rest our work on three working principles which offer 
a fairly sound basis for continued exploration of grammatical judgments: 
I. THE CONSENSUS PRINCIPLE: if there is no reason to think otherwise, assume that the 
judgments of any native speaker are characteristic of all speakers of a language. 
II. THE EXPERIMENTER PRINCIPLE: if there is any disagreement on introspective 
judgments, the judgments of those who are familiar with the theoretical issuesmay not 
be counted as evidence.  
III. THE CLEAR CASE PRINCIPLE: disputed judgments should be shown to include at 
least one consistent pattern in the speech community or be abandoned […]. 
A fourth principleis called for –aPrinciple of Validity:  
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IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF VALIDITY:when the use of language is shown to be more 
consistent than introspective judgments, a valid description of the language will agree 
with that use rather than introspections. (Labov 1975: 30-31 and 40) 
 
The four principles (consensus, experimenter, clear cases and validity) have a number 
ofimplications for linguistic practices (including reducing the relativity and non-credibility of 
data based on intuition, irrespective of the type of speaker), but also for the epistemology of 
linguistics. In particular,they reinforce the idea of a continuum between the competence of 
linguists and the competence of non-linguists since they rationalize intuitive data. 
 
2.3. When nonlinguists produce the research objects of linguists: the case of 
linguistic attitudes 
 
Folk linguistic opinions and knowledge constitute social theories of language. Applying 
generally to language practices through descriptions, prescriptions and interventions, folk 
theories provide social organizers that form a body of social knowledge. Socio-linguistics 
(operating as social linguistics) takes these social organizers as its objects of study, or more 
precisely as its meta-objects (i.e. objects talking about objects),referringto them as attitudes 
or representations. 
Language practices are used by lay speakers as a tool for psychological and social 
description. In their introduction to an issue of the Journal of Language and Social 
Psychologydevoted to linguistic attitudes, Preston and Milroy observed that speakers tend to 
match psychological traits with linguistic traits: 
 
Notably, several studies showed a tendency for judges to discriminate between, on the 
one hand, status dimensions such as intelligence, ambition, and confidence, and, on the 
other, solidarity-related dimensions such as social attractiveness, friendliness, and 
generosity. Standard speakers have tended to be rated higher on the former set of traits 
and downgraded on the latter, the converse being true of judgments of non standard 
speakers (e.g. Ryan, Giles, & Sebastian, 1982, p.9). – (Preston, Milroy, 1999: 4-5) 
 
Van Bezooijen and Gooskens made a similar observation in a study examining the perception 
of variety among Dutch speakers: 
 
Intraculturally (by Dutchlisteners), as well as cross-culturally (by British, Kenyan, 
Mexican, and Japanese listeners), a ―lively‖ manner of speaking is strongly associated 
with dominance, will, power, and self-confidence. As expected, pronunciation, 
allowing dialect identification, only played a role intraculturally. (Van Bezooijen, 
Gooskens 1999: 31-32) 
 
The results of the ‗Lambert method‘ (Lambert et al., 1960) are well-known: unbeknownst to 
subjects, bilingual speakers recorded versions of the same text in two or several languages or 
varieties in such a way as to eliminate voice bias. The subjects were then asked to evaluate 
the speaker using a scale involving antonymous adjectives (the speaker is friendly vs. 
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unfriendly, reliable vs. suspicious, gentle vs. violent, etc.). The method tends to produce 
fairly reliable results. For example, one study showed that native male English speakers tend 
to perceive women more positively if they speak French and that the latter generally return 
the favor:women‘s view of native male English speakers was found to be more positive than 
their view of native male speakers of other languages. 
 Non-scientific perceptions, laden with imaginary representations and productions, 
may therefore be said to constitute spontaneous theories of socio-psychological classification. 
 
Conclusion: nonlinguists are valuable linguists 
 
This paper has argued that data drawn from folk disciplinary practices can be fully 
incorporated into linguistic analysis. Folk linguistics has its own validity(a practical and 
representational validity) and should therefore be viewed by academic linguists as a reservoir 
of data that no professional linguist could possibly collect using ‗scientific‘ (academic) 
methods. 
 The extreme diversity of folk discursive positions, of the corresponding practices, and 
of the data thus collected, as well as the scientific uncertainty of many scientific observations 
(based on subjective positions since they are frequently idiolectal), should perhaps encourage 
us to reconsider and rethink the object of linguistics. If we accept, along with Bourdieu and 
Auroux, that ‗the historicization of the subject of historicization‘ (Bourdieu 2001; translated 
from the French) is an epistemological necessity, then it seems hardly reasonable to persist in 
defining the object of linguistics as Saussure did in 1916. The object of linguistics has been 
profoundly affected by the knowledge of which it has been the target, and folk knowledge is 
an integral part of such knowledge. This paper argues that we need to provide a convincing 
and (above all)a scientifically efficient new description of the object of linguistics and to 
adopt an anti-eliminative position that incorporatesthe various degrees of linguistic 
knowledge (from the ‗hardest‘ scientific knowledge to the ‗softest‘ folk knowledge). 
 An integrational perspective means opting for and rather than or – i.e. the linguist and 
the second-hand dealer, the writer and the one man show, the glossomaniac and the political 
activist. 
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1
 This paper was first published in french in Achard-Bayle, G., Paveau, M.-A. (eds) (2008a): « Linguistique 
populaire ? », Pratiques 139-140: 93-110. 
2
 See Achard-Bayle, Paveau (2008b), Achard-Bayle, Lecolle 2009, Antos 1996, Beacco (ed.) 2004, Brekle 
1989, Niedzielski, Preston 2003 [1999], Paveau 2000, 2005, 2007, 2008a, 2009, Paveau, Rosier, 2008. 
3
 I suggested the term in Paveau 2007 to describe a position that 1) considers folk linguistics from a non-binary 
perspective and as a matter of degree, i.e. in contrast to academic (scholarly) linguistics; and 2) aims to fully 
incorporate folk data into the scientific study of language. 
4
 See Paveau, Rosier 2008. 
5
 The five daughters of Mr. and Mrs. Holl, Jenny, Lydia, Beth, Nicole and Esther, are better illustrations of the 
extreme linguistic virtuosity, at the limit of theoretical mastery, of punsters and wordsmiths (in french : ‗j’ai ni 
diabète ni cholestérol’). 
6
 The term logophile is drawn from Pierssens (1976), while the term glossomaniac was coined by Eco (1994). 
7
 See http://correcteurs.blog.lemonde.fr 
8
 Douay-Soublin‘s unsurpassed paper is still the best synthesis of the issue: ‗La contre-analogie. Réflexion sur la 
récusation de certaines analogies pourtant bien formées cognitivement‘ (Douay-Soublin 1987). 
9
 The edition used is Artaud‘s Œuvres Complètes, Gallimard, 1976-1994. 
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10
 The term ethnic-cultural is used to refer to an accent found in a community of speakers with an immigration 
background, particularly immigrants from formerly colonized countries who were born in France but inherited 
the accent of the language of origin (particularly North Africa and Black Africa). Here, ethnic-cultural accents 
also include the accents of speakers from the DOM-TOM, Antilles-French Guiana, the Indian Ocean, and New 
Caledonia. 
11
 ‗Comment vous dire/le costume/Il était tellement petit/que/c‘est une coustime [kustim]‘ (from the show 
Cocktail Khorotv (literally, Cocktail of lies), quoted by Terbouche 2008: 14). 
12
 Speaker intuition and epilinguistic awareness, the former of American origin and the latter of French origin, 
tend in many respects to overlap. Both concepts refer to a non-objectified, non-formulated (non-articulated) and 
non-formalized competence of speakers in relation to their language productions. In the introspective method, 
the faculty shifts toward metalanguage, whether spontaneous or erudite. 
